The Plots Against George Washington During the Revolution

Throughout the American Revolution, George Washington faced threats not only from British redcoats but from political intrigue within his own ranks — plots that tested his authority as commander in chief of the Continental Army. During the Conway Cabal of 1777 and the Newburgh Conspiracy of 1783, critics and dissatisfied officers sought to undermine or replace him. Washington’s political skill preserved his command and kept the army subordinated to civilian rule. For Native nations, this mattered enormously: a fragmented American military command would have shattered the diplomatic architecture that Indigenous leaders had navigated since first contact — from the Covenant Chain of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy to the treaty councils of the Ohio Country. Whether Washington held power, and how he surrendered it, would shape every land cession, treaty, and removal that followed.

The Conway Cabal: Dissent That Never Became a Conspiracy

Washington’s command came under fire in the fall of 1777. After stinging defeats at Brandywine and Germantown, and the British occupation of Philadelphia, criticism of his leadership grew louder. Pennsylvania attorney general Jonathan Dickinson Sergeant complained openly that “thousands of lives and millions of property are yearly sacrificed to the insufficiency of our commander-in-chief.”

Some called for replacing Washington with General Horatio Gates, whose star was rising after his stunning victory at the Battle of Saratoga — the same campaign that convinced France to ally with the Americans and, indirectly, to preserve Native diplomatic leverage in the Great Lakes region. Among Washington’s sharpest critics was Brigadier General Thomas Conway, an Irish-born officer who mocked his tactics. In an October 1777 letter to Gates, Conway sneered that “Heaven has been determined to save your country, or a weak general and bad councilors would have ruined it.”

The “Conway Cabal” was less a full conspiracy than a loose network of critics, but Washington fumed at the “secret, insidious attempt…to wound my reputation” after a drunken aide to Gates leaked the letter’s contents. He informed both men he had seen their correspondence and signaled willingness to step aside if the public wanted another commander. “Whenever the public gets dissatisfied with my services, or a person is found better qualified to answer her expectations, I shall quit the helm,” he wrote.

Though some in the Continental Congress questioned Washington’s leadership, no broad consensus emerged to replace him. His generals rallied to his defense with letters of support, and the crisis subsided. As historian David Head, author of A Crisis of Peace: George Washington, the Newburgh Conspiracy, and the Fate of the American Revolution, observed: “Washington does not get enough credit as a politician. And that’s where his real skill was, in the politics of the war.”

Had Gates or Conway succeeded, the Revolution’s course against Native nations — whose alliances with Britain, France, and the American colonies turned on personal relationships with commanders — would have unfolded very differently. The Haudenosaunee Confederacy’s divisions during the war, and the tragic aftermath for the Mohawk, Seneca, and their kin, played out precisely because American command held together.

The Newburgh Conspiracy: When the Army Nearly Overthrew Its Own Government

The 1781 victory at Yorktown did not end the war. It dragged into 1783 as peace negotiations continued and British troops remained in New York City — just 50 miles from Washington’s headquarters near Newburgh, New York. With no treaty signed, Washington kept the Continental Army on high alert.

A greater threat came from within. Frustration mounted as Congress failed to deliver promised back pay and officer pensions. On March 10, 1783, an anonymous letter — likely written by Major John Armstrong Jr., an aide to Gates — urged officers to either abandon the army or march on Philadelphia to force Congress to honor its commitments.

Washington recognized the danger. “If the war ends with the military destroying the civilian government, then there’s no point in the war at all,” Head explains. Washington canceled the unauthorized meeting and called an official assembly for March 15. The roughly 500 officers gathered in a wooden auditorium known as the Temple of Virtue did not expect Washington to appear — making his entrance all the more dramatic.

Pulling prepared remarks from his coat, Washington denounced the letter’s author: “Can he be a friend to the army? Can he be a friend to this country? Rather, is he not an insidious foe?” After chastising his officers for sowing discord between civil and military authorities, he urged patience, assuring them Congress would eventually meet its obligations.

Then came the moment that transformed the meeting. Struggling to read the small handwriting of a letter, Washington fumbled putting on his newly prescribed spectacles and apologized: “Gentlemen, you will permit me to put on my spectacles, for I have grown not only gray, but almost blind in the service of my country.” The display of vulnerability moved some officers to tears.

The appeal worked. The officers reaffirmed their loyalty to civilian government and proclaimed their “unshaken confidence” in Congress, reinforcing the principle of civilian control of the military that would become a cornerstone of the American republic — and, tragically, a principle later invoked to justify the dispossession of Native nations through legislation like the Dawes Act and its devastating impact on tribal lands.

Resignation at Annapolis: A Precedent With Consequences for Indigenous Sovereignty

When peace arrived with the Treaty of Paris, Washington rejected the precedent of rebel leaders like Oliver Cromwell and voluntarily relinquished his command. On December 23, 1783, he resigned before the Confederation Congress in Annapolis, Maryland. His hands trembled and voice cracked as he concluded: “Having now finished the work assigned me, I retire from the great theater of action.” After sleeping in 280 houses during the war, Washington returned to Mount Vernon.

Retirement proved brief. After presiding over the Constitutional Convention, Washington was elected the nation’s first president, intending to serve only until the new constitutional government stabilized. Less than three years in, a weary Washington asked James Madison to draft a farewell address for a single-term exit. Concerned that the nation’s growing political divisions still required a unifying leader, he agreed to a second term. By 1796, though, he retired for good. His farewell address, drafted with Alexander Hamilton’s help, warned against partisanship before he returned to the “shade of retirement” at Mount Vernon.

The crises that tested Washington’s authority foreshadowed the example he set as president: that political and military power should be exercised reluctantly and surrendered willingly. As Head puts it, “The way that Washington handled the Newburgh Conspiracy, resigning his commission in Annapolis at the end of 1783, and stepping down from the presidency all flowed from the same source — Washington’s conviction that power is to be held temporarily.”

Yet for Native nations, this same constitutional framework produced the machinery of removal. The federal treaty power Washington helped consolidate would be turned, within decades, into instruments of dispossession — the roots of policies traced in accounts of the historical context of the Indian Removal Act and its catastrophic consequences.

Why Native Nations Watched American Command Crises Closely

During the Revolution, Native nations were not passive observers. The Haudenosaunee Confederacy fractured under pressure from both sides; the Oneida and Tuscarora sided with the Americans, while the Mohawk, Seneca, Cayuga, and Onondaga largely backed Britain. The Lenape (Delaware), Shawnee, Miami, and other Ohio Country nations weighed alliances with British agents against American promises that were rarely kept. A weak, divided American command would have meant less credible promises — but also more room for Indigenous diplomatic maneuvering.

After the war, the new federal government’s ability to speak with one voice militarily shaped how treaties were negotiated. Washington’s success in preserving civilian authority produced the very framework that later enabled treaty-making — and treaty-breaking — at scale. The Treaty of Greenville (1795), the Proclamation of 1763’s unraveling, and the defining struggles for sovereignty all trace directly back to the political stability Washington secured. Readers exploring the deeper history of Native resilience against these forces may find valuable perspective in the account of the historical resilience of Native American cultures against assimilation.

Historical Context & Key Cultural Takeaways

• Civilian control was preserved by Washington’s political skill — not battlefield genius. The Conway Cabal (1777) and Newburgh Conspiracy (1783) were defeated through persuasion, letters, and personal gravitas.
• Native nations were active participants in the Revolutionary era, choosing alliances based on their own sovereignty interests, not colonial agendas.
• The Haudenosaunee Confederacy’s own democratic model — famously admired by Franklin and other founders — influenced American constitutional thinking, yet the Confederacy itself was shattered by the war Washington won.
• Washington’s resignation at Annapolis (December 23, 1783) set a precedent that power is held temporarily — a principle that Indigenous scholars emphasize must now be applied to treaty obligations and land restoration.
• The federal framework Washington stabilized would within two generations be used to implement removal policies devastating to Cherokee, Creek, Choctaw, Chickasaw, and Seminole peoples.

Frequently Asked Questions

What was the Conway Cabal?

The Conway Cabal was a loose network of critics in 1777 — centered on General Horatio Gates and Brigadier General Thomas Conway — who questioned Washington’s competence after defeats at Brandywine and Germantown. It was not a formal conspiracy, and it never came close to removing Washington, but it exposed political fault lines within the Continental Army and Congress.

What was the Newburgh Conspiracy?

The Newburgh Conspiracy was a March 1783 movement among Continental Army officers frustrated by Congress’s failure to deliver back pay and pensions. An anonymous letter (likely by Major John Armstrong Jr.) urged officers to challenge Congress. Washington’s dramatic March 15 speech at the Temple of Virtue — capped by his spectacles remark — defused the crisis and reaffirmed civilian control.

Why did the Newburgh Conspiracy matter to Native nations?

A military coup would have destroyed the young republic’s credibility with Indigenous nations and European powers alike, leaving treaty negotiations in chaos. Washington’s success in maintaining civilian authority allowed the United States to speak with one voice in later treaties — treaties that Native nations navigated with enduring diplomatic skill.

Did Native Americans fight in the American Revolution?

Yes. Native nations fought on both sides and often for their own strategic reasons. The Oneida and Tuscarora aided the Americans; most of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy allied with Britain; the Shawnee, Lenape, Miami, and others in the Ohio Country fought largely with British support to defend their homelands from colonial expansion.

How did Washington’s example shape later U.S. policy toward Native peoples?

Washington’s conviction that power is temporary shaped the peaceful transfer of authority — but the federal power he helped consolidate was soon turned against Native nations through treaty manipulation, land cessions, and eventually removal policies like the Indian Removal Act of 1830. The same constitutional framework that preserved civilian control also centralized the authority to dispossess.

Concluding Synthesis: Power Held Temporarily, Sovereignty Denied Too Long

The plots against George Washington — the Conway Cabal and the Newburgh Conspiracy — reveal that the American Revolution’s most dangerous battles were internal. Washington’s political skill preserved both his command and the principle that the military answers to civilian authority. That achievement deserves the recognition it has received. But the same principle, and the same centralized federal power it stabilized, enabled the United States to pursue treaty-making and land policies that Native nations have resisted, survived, and outlasted for over two centuries.

Washington’s famous willingness to surrender power stands in sharp contrast to how the American government has treated Indigenous sovereignty — as something to be extinguished rather than recognized. Understanding the Revolution’s internal crises helps explain both the republic’s durability and its ongoing obligations to the first peoples of this land. True historical accuracy means honoring Washington’s restraint without erasing the dispossession his government’s framework made possible.