Military & Government in the Formative Years – 1783-1812
By Richard W. Stewart
The nascent United States, fresh from its victory in the Revolutionary War, faced a complex challenge: establishing a stable and effective military and governmental structure. The period between 1783 and 1812, often referred to as the formative years, witnessed a struggle to balance the ideals of liberty with the practical necessities of national defense. This era, marked by the aftermath of revolution and the looming shadow of European powers, shaped the very character of the American military and government. The establishment of a peacetime army, the creation of the Constitution, and the development of military supply systems all played critical roles in defining the young nation’s identity.
The formal end of the Revolutionary War, signified by the signing of the Treaty of Paris in September 1783, prompted the Continental Congress to grapple with the immediate task of demobilization. General George Washington, the celebrated commander of the Continental Army, was directed to discharge a significant portion of the federal forces. While maintaining a contingent to oversee the British departure from New York, Washington ultimately retained only a skeletal force of approximately 600 men, primarily to safeguard military supplies at West Point and other strategic locations. This decision reflected a deep-seated ambivalence toward standing armies, a sentiment deeply ingrained in the American psyche following years of conflict with the British Crown.
The road to demobilization was far from smooth. The Continental Army, having endured years of hardship and sacrifice, grew increasingly restless, particularly concerning the issue of unpaid wages. The specter of potential unrest loomed large, fueled by anonymous addresses circulating among officers at Newburgh, New York. These addresses hinted at the possibility of military intervention if grievances regarding pay and future prospects were not addressed. General Washington, recognizing the gravity of the situation, skillfully diffused the threat through an impassioned appeal to his officers, promising to advocate on their behalf. Congress, recognizing the validity of the Army’s concerns, ultimately conceded to their demands, agreeing to provide back pay and grant them full pay for five years, a compromise that averted a potentially disastrous crisis. This turbulent period underscored the challenges inherent in transitioning from a wartime footing to a peacetime establishment. The question of a peacetime army became a focal point of debate.
The Question of a Peacetime Army
The prevailing sentiment within Congress favored a "well-regulated and disciplined militia" as the primary line of national defense. The creation of a standing army was viewed with suspicion, burdened by the weight of historical precedent and the fear of centralized power. A permanent military establishment would not only impose a significant financial burden but also exacerbate the existing tensions between proponents of a strong national government and those who favored a loose federation of states. The recent unrest within the Continental Army further fueled anxieties that a standing army could become an instrument of coercion or even despotism, echoing the English experience with Oliver Cromwell’s military dictatorship.
Seeking guidance on this critical issue, Alexander Hamilton’s committee turned to General Washington. The General, while acknowledging the potential dangers of a large standing army in peacetime, also recognized the need for a degree of military preparedness. He argued that the nation was "too poor" to maintain a substantial standing army adequate for its defense. He suggested exploring the possibility of building and equipping a Navy. Washington proposed relying on an improved version of the traditional citizens’ militia, a force composed of all able-bodied males between the ages of 18 and 50, liable for service in times of emergency. He also advocated for a volunteer militia, recruited in units, periodically trained, and subject to national control rather than state control. At the same time, Washington also recognized the need for a small Regular Army "to awe the Indians, protect our Trade, prevent the encroachment of our Neighbors of Canada and the Floridas, and guard us at least from surprises; also for the security of our magazines." He recommended a force of four regiments of infantry and one of artillery, totaling 2,630 officers and men.
Hamilton’s committee, drawing upon the advice of figures such as General Friedrich von Steuben, Major General Louis le Bèque du Portail, and Secretary at War Benjamin Lincoln, formulated a plan similar to Washington’s, albeit with a more ambitious militia program. However, the proposal ultimately failed to garner sufficient support within Congress. Sectional rivalries, constitutional concerns, and, above all, economic constraints proved insurmountable obstacles. The new republic lacked a robust administrative and revenue base, further complicating the challenge of establishing a viable military force.
Despite these setbacks, the debate over a peacetime army continued. A revised plan, proposing a larger army at a lower cost through reduced pay for regimental staff officers and subalterns, also failed to gain traction. Many delegates shared Washington’s skepticism regarding the feasibility of a larger establishment at a lower cost. The issue remained unresolved throughout the winter of 1783, hampered by the supermajority requirement under the Articles of Confederation for exercising vital powers, including those related to military matters.
In the spring of 1784, the question of a permanent peacetime army became intertwined with the politics of state claims to western lands. The majority of soldiers in the remaining infantry regiment and artillery battalion hailed from Massachusetts and New Hampshire, states eager to alleviate the financial burden of providing supplemental pay promised upon enlistment. Congress, however, declined to assume this responsibility unless the New England states supported the establishment of a permanent military. Representatives from New England, led by Elbridge Gerry of Massachusetts, argued that Congress lacked the authority to maintain a standing army. New York, contesting New England’s claims to western lands, refused to endorse any permanent military establishment unless permitted to garrison the western forts with its own forces. The posts that had been the object of most concern and discussion dominated the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River.
These posts, strategically located along the Great Lakes and the St. Lawrence River, were of paramount importance. Although situated on American territory south of the boundary established by the Treaty of Paris, they remained under British control following the war. The treaty stipulated the transfer of these posts to the United States as expeditiously as possible. Congress recognized the necessity of retaining a force to occupy these posts upon their evacuation by the British. The challenge lay in determining how and by whom these troops would be raised. The issue was particularly urgent given ongoing treaty negotiations with the Native American tribes of the Northwest. A substantial military presence would undoubtedly bolster the American negotiating position. The stalemate between the New England states and New York, however, persisted until early June 1784.
In a compromise reached during the final days of the session, Congress ordered the disbandment of the existing infantry regiment and artillery battalion, with the exception of 80 artillerymen retained to guard military stores at West Point and Fort Pitt. This action was coupled with a measure providing for the immediate recruitment of a new force of 700 men, comprising a regiment of eight infantry and two artillery companies, intended as the nucleus of a new Regular Army. By recommending that the states provide troops from their militia rather than making direct requisitions, Congress circumvented much of the New England opposition.
Four states were tasked with providing troops: Pennsylvania (260), Connecticut (165), New York (165), and New Jersey (110). Lieutenant Colonel Josiah Harmar of Pennsylvania was appointed commanding officer. By the end of September 1784, only New Jersey and Pennsylvania had fulfilled their quotas by enlisting volunteers from their militia.
Meanwhile, Congress received discouraging news regarding the British evacuation of the frontier posts. Objections from Canadian fur traders and settlers in Upper Canada had prompted the British government to secretly instruct the Governor-General of Canada to postpone the evacuation pending further orders. The failure of the United States to comply with treaty stipulations regarding the recovery of debts owed to Loyalists provided the British with a convenient pretext to delay the evacuation for an additional 12 years.
The New Jersey contingent of Colonel Harmar’s force was dispatched to Fort Stanwix, in upstate New York, to negotiate land cessions with the Iroquois Confederacy. The remainder of the force moved to Fort MacIntosh, down the Ohio River from Fort Pitt, where similar negotiations were conducted with the Native American tribes of the upper Ohio River.
Toward a More Perfect Union
The postwar challenges exposed critical deficiencies in the Articles of Confederation. The federal government lacked a separate executive branch and a judiciary. While Congress possessed a degree of executive and legislative power, it lacked the authority to levy taxes, rendering it financially dependent on the states. Disputes and conflicts among the states over western lands threatened to destabilize the fledgling nation. Rioting and unrest in Massachusetts during the fall and winter of 1786 heightened fears of national collapse. A severe commercial depression, following a brief postwar boom, inflicted particular hardship on farmers in the back-country. Angry mobs disrupted court proceedings, harassed lawyers and magistrates, and threatened the government arsenal in Springfield.
In response to this growing crisis, Congress called upon several states to raise a 1,340-man force for a three-year term. The New England states did not object to congressional action. However, before the congressionally authorized troops could intervene, local militiamen repelled an attack on the Springfield Arsenal led by Daniel Shays in late January 1787. The arrival of reinforcements from the eastern part of the state quelled the disturbances. Recruitment for the force authorized by Congress continued until the following April, by which time approximately 550 men had been enlisted. Concerns over the escalating costs prompted Congress to halt recruitment and discharge the troops already raised, retaining only two artillery companies to guard West Point and the Springfield Arsenal. Shays’ Rebellion, while ultimately suppressed, served as a catalyst for the first augmentation of the federal Army and, more importantly, underscored the need for a stronger national government.
The growing concern over the federal government’s ineffectiveness, particularly in matters of finance and commercial regulation, led to the convening of a Constitutional Convention in the spring of 1787. Strengthening the military powers of the government was a principal objective of the convention, no less crucial than establishing its financial and commercial authority. The inherent tension between the desire for a strong central government and the deep-seated fear of a standing army became a central theme in the debates surrounding military matters. Even those who advocated for a broad grant of authority to the central government, such as Hamilton, harbored reservations regarding standing armies, fearing the potential for military usurpation of political power or its use by officeholders to perpetuate their control.
The final compromise, enshrined in the new Constitution, addressed the issue of military powers through a system of checks and balances. Central to this system was the principle of specified and reserved powers. The states retained all powers not explicitly granted to the central government. The Constitution empowered the central government to raise and maintain an army without relying on the states. By granting Congress the power to levy taxes, the Constitution provided the necessary financial resources. The creation of a separate executive branch enabled the government to conduct its daily affairs without constant recourse to the states.
The Constitution vested Congress with the exclusive power to declare war, raise armies, and provide for a navy. It also empowered Congress to call forth the militia "to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions." However, authority over the militia was shared. Congress could provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining the militia and governing "such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States." The Constitution expressly reserved to the states the authority to appoint militia officers and train the militia "according to the discipline prescribed by Congress."
The militia issue also played a crucial role in shaping the Second Amendment to the Constitution: the right to keep and bear arms. The Founding Fathers recognized the importance of freedom of speech, the press, and assembly, but they also believed that these freedoms could only be secured if the people retained the right to keep and bear arms as a check on the power of the government. The Second Amendment has been subject to considerable political debate since its adoption as part of the Bill of Rights. However, the architects of the government clearly envisioned the militia as the cornerstone of the national military establishment, and the concept of the militia and the right to bear arms are inextricably linked.
The new Constitution introduced a significant innovation by assigning all executive power to the President. The Secretary of War, therefore, became directly responsible to the President rather than to Congress. The Constitution specifically designated the President as Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy. As such, his powers were exclusive, limited only "by their nature and the principles of our institutions." The President had the right to assume personal command of forces in the field or to delegate that right. As Commander in Chief, he was responsible for the employment and disposition of the armed forces in times of peace and for the general direction of military and naval operations during war.
In April 1789, George Washington became the first President under the new Constitution. On August 7, Congress established the Department of War. However, there was no immediate change in policy or personnel. General Henry Knox, who had succeeded Washington as commander of the Army and had been managing military affairs under the old government, remained in charge. In the absence of a navy, a separate department was deemed unnecessary, and the War Department initially included naval affairs within its jurisdiction. Brigadier General Harmar, who had held the rank during the Confederation period, was confirmed in his appointment, as were his officers, and the existing minuscule Army was taken over intact by the new government. In August 1789, this force comprised approximately 800 officers and men, stationed along the Ohio River in a series of forts built after 1785.
The small size of the Army obviated the need for an extensive field organization to supply its needs. In accordance with established military theory, the Confederation Congress had discharged the Quartermaster General and his assistants in 1783, placing the military supply system under civilian control. The civilian Secretary was responsible for transporting, safeguarding, and distributing military supplies, while the Board of Treasury was responsible for procuring and purchasing all military stores, including food and clothing. The new federal government retained the supply system established under the Confederation, adding the civilian Office of the Quartermaster General in 1792 to transport supplies to the frontier posts during Indian expeditions. In 1794, Congress established the Office of the Purveyor of Public Supplies in the Treasury and the Office of Superintendent of Military Stores in the War Department to continue the broad supply functions established in the Confederation period. This organizational structure remained in effect, with only minor modifications, until 1812.
The Office of the Purveyor of Public Supplies utilized the contract system to procure food and equipment, operating much as it had in colonial times. Contracts were awarded to the lowest bidder, who agreed to deliver and issue authorized subsistence at a fixed price to troops at a given post. The contractor was obligated to maintain sufficient rations to feed the troops at all times, providing subsistence for at least six months in advance at the more distant posts. The procurement, storage, and distribution of all other supplies for the Army were centralized in Philadelphia, where the Purveyor contracted for clothing, camp utensils, military stores, medicines, and hospital stores, and the Superintendent of Military Stores collected and issued them as needed by the troops. The contract system, while intended to be more economical and efficient than direct purchase, soon revealed its weaknesses. The quality of the supplies and the promptness of their delivery were often compromised by the contractor’s profit motives and susceptibility to corruption.
The method of arms procurement was a variation of the contract purchase system. Recognizing the importance of developing a domestic arms industry, Hamilton had advocated for "the public manufacture of arms, powder, etc." as early as 1783. A decade later, Secretary Knox reported to Congress that, while arms could be purchased more cheaply in Europe, the lower price was insignificant compared to the advantages of expanding and perfecting the means upon which national safety ultimately depended. Congress responded by increasing the number of U.S. arsenals and magazines for stockpiling weapons and by establishing national armories to manufacture weapons. The first national armory was established at Springfield, Massachusetts, in 1794, followed by a second at Harpers Ferry, Virginia, in the same year. Despite these efforts, the government continued to purchase most of its armament abroad, and it would take many years before the domestic industry could fully meet the government’s needs.
The Militia
Washington consistently emphasized that an effective militia was the only viable alternative to a large standing army. However, his efforts, along with those of Knox and Hamilton, to enhance the militia’s effectiveness through federal regulation were unsuccessful. Congress passed the basic militia law in May 1792, calling for the enrollment of "every able-bodied white male citizen" between the ages of eighteen and forty-five and the organization of the militia into divisions, brigades, regiments, battalions, and companies by the individual states. Each militiaman was required to provide his own "arms, munitions, and other accouterments." The law that ultimately emerged from the legislative process bore little resemblance to the one proposed by Washington and Knox. It left compliance with its provisions up to the states and did little more than federally recognize the colonial militia organization that had plagued Washington during the Revolution. Despite these limitations, the act preserved the concept of citizen soldiery, a principle of profound importance to the country’s future, and created special volunteer units to supplement the obligatory mass system. These volunteers, organized into companies, met regularly for military training under elected officers, and they became the precursors to the National Guard.
Training and discipline were essential to an effective militia. However, despite the act of 1792, the militia was neither disciplined nor well-trained. Only highly trained troops could be expected to successfully employ the complicated, formal linear tactics of the day. Strictly interpreting the constitutional provision that reserved to the states the authority to train the militia, Congress left the extent and thoroughness of training entirely to the states and merely prescribed Steuben’s system of discipline and field exercises as the rules to be followed.
Limitations on the length of tours of duty and the circumstances under which the militia could be called into federal service further diminished its usefulness. No militiaman could be compelled to serve more than three months in any year, nor could the President order the militia to duty outside the United States. The impact of these limitations would become readily apparent during the War of 1812.
The President first exercised his authority to employ the militia to suppress insurrection and enforce the laws of Congress in 1794, when he dispatched a large force of militia under Major General Henry Lee into western Pennsylvania during the Whiskey Rebellion. Lee encountered no resistance. While the demonstration was impressive as a show of force, its value as an indication of the military value of the militia in an emergency was inconclusive.
Military Realities in the Federalist Period
The military policies of the new nation evolved realistically in response to both foreign and domestic developments. The United States faced little military threat from foreign nations. Britain had no desire or intention of reconquering its former colonies, although both Britain and Spain sought to limit American expansion beyond the borders established by the Treaty of 1783. The military alliance between the United States and France, England’s archrival, posed a potential danger, but England and France were at peace until 1793. The undeclared naval war between the U.S. and France from 1798 to 1800 was almost entirely a naval confrontation.
The jealousy of the individual states toward each other and toward the federal government hindered the establishment of a federal army and thwarted efforts to institute federal regulation of the militia beyond the minimum permitted by the Constitution. The federal government, burdened by financial constraints, was forced to prioritize expenditures. Americans were reluctant to serve in the Army, either as regulars or as volunteers, for extended periods. The government struggled to recruit enough men to bring the Regular Army up to authorized strength. These factors made a large regular military establishment infeasible. Even a well-trained militia capable of augmenting the regular force was lacking. This period between 1783 and 1812, shaped the very character of the American military and government.