Sherman’s Famous March to the Sea
By Jacob Dolson Cox, 1910
The autumn of 1864 witnessed the unfolding of one of the most audacious and controversial campaigns of the American Civil War: Sherman’s Famous March to the Sea. Union General William T. Sherman, a figure of both admiration and animosity, embarked on a strategic maneuver that aimed to cripple the Confederacy’s ability to wage war. As he prepared to sever ties with his supply lines in Tennessee, Sherman communicated to his officers a clear understanding of the campaign’s stakes. He believed Georgia’s defensive capabilities were inadequate to significantly impede his advance.
Prior to his departure from Atlanta, Sherman articulated a crucial strategic objective to his key subordinates. He emphasized that a Union army’s presence at Columbia, South Carolina, held the potential to effectively end the war. This outcome, however, hinged on the army’s ability to withstand potential attacks and avoid being routed. Sherman reasoned that cutting off the Confederacy’s material support, with the exception of North Carolina, would cripple its capacity to sustain its army in Richmond, Virginia, and replenish its depleted treasury. The Confederate States of America had already experienced the challenges of governing territory isolated from the rest of the nation. The region west of the Mississippi River, for example, had proven incapable of providing sufficient manpower, finances, or supplies. This isolation, coupled with anxieties about the well-being of families residing within Union-controlled territories, led to desertions among soldiers and a decline in overall confidence within the Confederate army.
The Confederacy’s dire circumstances would lead to a collapse of credit, rendering its paper money worthless and cutting off foreign aid. Only one desperate gamble remained: Confederate General Robert E. Lee could attempt to break away from Union General Ulysses S. Grant’s forces, overwhelm Sherman’s army, and re-establish Confederate dominance by abandoning Virginia. However, such a maneuver would require Lee to successfully evade Grant, who maintained a position south of Petersburg, Virginia, nearly as close to Columbia as Lee himself. Grant would relentlessly pursue Lee from the moment the Confederate lines around Richmond were abandoned.
Therefore, if Sherman reached Columbia with a formidable army, capable of withstanding Lee’s initial assault, the Confederacy’s last vestige of hope would be extinguished. The national forces, converging from both the east and west, would crush the rebellion. Crucially, this scenario depended on Union Major General George H. Thomas’s ability to hold off Confederate General John Bell Hood’s advances until the Eastern campaign concluded. In the ensuing collapse of the Richmond government, Hood would be compelled to abandon the futile cause, mirroring Confederate General Joseph E. Johnston’s surrender following Lee’s defeat in the spring.
Establishing a secure base of operations along the coast was essential to separate the Carolinas from the Gulf States. Achieving this objective required the systematic destruction of railway infrastructure throughout Georgia. While the army could subsist off the land during its march, it needed reliable supply lines within a short timeframe after halting. The hostile nature of the region further complicated matters, as formal requisitions for supplies from local governments were unlikely to be fulfilled. The wasteful nature of foraging necessitated constant movement into new territories. A swift march to the sea, the seizure of a strategically important harbor capable of being fortified, and the establishment of maritime communication lines with the Union’s major depots in the North constituted the initial phase of Sherman’s grand strategy. Beyond this point, Sherman refrained from detailed planning, acknowledging the potential for unforeseen challenges that might necessitate adjustments to his course. He contemplated the possibility of marching west rather than east of Macon, Georgia, as an alternative.
Sherman instructed Union naval forces to maintain vigilance along the coast, specifically at Morris Island near Charleston, South Carolina; Ossabaw Sound, just south of Savannah, Georgia; and Pensacola, Florida, and Mobile, Alabama. Reaching Morris Island would likely involve a route through Augusta, Georgia, and along the Savannah River’s left bank. Similarly, Ossabaw Sound would suggest a path through Milledgeville, Millen, and the Ogeechee River valley. The Gulf ports would only be considered if an eastward advance proved impossible.
On November 12, 1864, communication with the rear was severed. The railway bridge at Allatoona, Georgia, was dismantled and transported to the rear for storage. From the Etowah River crossing southward to Atlanta, the entire railway line was thoroughly destroyed. Foundries, machine shops, and factories in Rome were burned to prevent their reuse by Confederate forces. On November 14th, the Union army converged on Atlanta. Composed of troops from various corps and divisions under different commanders, the force was estimated to exceed 59,000 men. Furloughed soldiers and new recruits rapidly converged at the front, resulting in a muster roll exceeding 62,000 at Atlanta.
No effort was spared in transforming this force into a highly efficient fighting machine. Operating deep within enemy territory, without a secure base of operations, the army could not afford to be encumbered by sick soldiers or have its supply trains and artillery delayed by weak or inadequate teams. The artillery was reduced to approximately one gun per thousand men, with batteries typically consisting of four guns, each equipped with eight well-conditioned horses per gun or caisson. Twenty days’ worth of rations were carried, along with 200 rounds of ammunition of all types in the wagons. Herds of beef cattle were prepared to accompany the march, providing a readily available meat supply. These herds tended to grow larger as the army traversed the countryside.
The decision to abandon Atlanta also necessitated the destruction of much of the infrastructure that had been constructed during the early autumn. As the Union forces could not utilize the town, its defenses, workshops, mills, and depots had to be demolished and burned. This task was assigned to Colonel Poe, the Chief Engineer, and was completed before the army was assembled and ready to proceed southward. On the morning of November 15th, the movement commenced. The two corps of each wing were instructed to advance along separate roads, initially diverging sharply to create the impression of a threat to both Macon and Augusta. Sherman himself accompanied the left wing, following the railway line from Atlanta to Augusta, enabling him to gather timely intelligence regarding any defensive efforts undertaken by the Confederate government in the Carolinas. This approach would provide him with the best basis for determining the appropriate direction for his columns after reaching the Oconee River.
The general trajectory of Sherman’s Famous March to the Sea lay between the Ocmulgee and Oconee Rivers. However, his right wing initially followed more westerly routes along the Macon Railroad, deceiving the enemy and dislodging Confederate General Joseph Wheeler’s cavalry and approximately 3,000 Georgia Militia troops, led by General G. W. Smith, who had been stationed at Lovejoy’s Station for several days. General Oliver O. Howard’s right wing (Fifteenth Corps) advanced via Jonesborough, McDonough, and Indian Spring, reaching the Ocmulgee River crossing at Planters’ Factory. The Seventeenth Corps maintained a slightly more easterly position, reaching the river at the same location. Union General Judson Kilpatrick, with the majority of the cavalry, operated on this flank, driving Confederate skirmishers back to Lovejoy’s Station. Smith swiftly retreated towards Macon with his infantry, while two cavalry brigades defended the old lines at Lovejoy’s Station with two artillery pieces. Kilpatrick dismounted his men and launched a successful foot charge on the works. He followed up with another attack, capturing the guns and pursuing the retreating enemy several miles toward Macon. The cavalry continued its feigned advance nearly to Forsyth, creating the impression of a major push in that direction. Subsequently, it turned eastward and crossed the Ocmulgee River alongside the infantry.
Each corps was equipped with a pontoon train, and Howard established two bridges. While his leading elements reached Planters’ Factory on November 18th, and the bridges remained in constant use, the rear guard did not cross until the morning of November 20th. The eastern bank of the river was steep and slippery due to rain, making the ascent for the supply trains difficult. Meanwhile, Howard’s forward columns continued their advance, reaching Clinton, a few miles north of Macon, by the time the rear guard had crossed the river. Kilpatrick then launched a feint towards Macon, striking the railway slightly east of the town, capturing and destroying a train, and tearing up a mile of track. Under the cover of this diversion, and while the cavalry maintained control of all roads north and east of Macon, Howard’s infantry converged on Gordon, a station on the Savannah railroad, 20 miles eastward, on November 22nd.
Union General Charles R. Woods’s division of the Fifteenth Corps brought up the rear, approaching Griswoldville. The left wing, accompanied by Sherman, focused on the systematic destruction of the railway from Atlanta to Augusta, thoroughly dismantling it to Madison, 70 miles from Atlanta, and destroying the Oconee River bridge, 10-12 miles further on. At this point, the divergence between the wings was at its greatest, with a distance of 50 miles in a direct line separating General Henry Slocum’s left flank from Kilpatrick on the right.
Sherman’s advance from Atlanta elicited a flurry of telegraphic dispatches from Confederate General P.G.T. Beauregard to all Confederate civil and military officials. Beauregard emphasized that he had ordered General Richard Taylor in Alabama to move his available forces into Georgia. However, Taylor lacked available forces and could only travel in person to Macon, arriving on November 22nd, just in time to encounter Governor Joseph E. Brown and his Adjutant, Robert Toombs, fleeing the State Capitol as General Slocum’s columns approached. The only organized troops present were Wheeler’s cavalry, Smith’s division of Georgia Militia, and a few local volunteer battalions. General Howell Cobb held the nominal command of Confederate "reserves," but no reserves were available.
Beauregard issued a proclamation from Corinth, Mississippi, urging the people of Georgia to rise up in defense of the state and to "obstruct and destroy all roads in Sherman’s front, flank, and rear," assuring them that the enemy would then starve. He also attempted to raise false hopes by claiming that he was hastening to join them in defending their homes. A more practical step was his order to General Hood to initiate the Tennessee campaign, which was the only counter-stroke within his power. At Milledgeville, Georgia, the legislature responded to Sherman’s approach with an act calling for the mass conscription of the population, accompanied by a hysterical preamble portraying the Union general as a monster and urging the people "to die freemen rather than live slaves." To have been effective, the act should have been passed a month earlier, when Hood was beginning his westward march from Gadsden. By this point, it was merely an admission of terror, as there was no time for proper organization.
Any attempts by the local populace to destroy roads along Sherman’s route were effectively suppressed by Sherman, who announced that the homes and property of those who engaged in such actions would be destroyed. Such opposition is ineffective against a large army; it only serves to increase the suffering of the civilian population through retaliation. In this case, there was ample evidence that the majority of the people were weary of the war and had lost the enthusiasm required for self-sacrifice.
However, as the troops moved forward, they encountered resistance and participated in numerous skirmishes, including the Battle of Griswoldville on November 22, when Union Brigadier General Charles Walcutt’s six infantry regiments clashed with the Georgia Militia. The Union force withstood three determined charges before reinforcements arrived in the form of one infantry regiment and two cavalry regiments. The Confederates did not attack again and soon retreated. The Union victory resulted in estimated casualties of 62 Union soldiers and 650 Confederate soldiers.
The right wing commenced the destruction of the railway at Griswoldville, and very little of the 100-mile stretch of road between that station and Millen, Georgia, remained intact. General Oliver O. Howard encountered difficulties crossing the Oconee River near Ball’s Ferry, as the river was swollen, and the current was too strong for the ferry to operate. Confederate General Wheeler’s cavalry offered some resistance from the opposite bank. A detachment of troops, guided by engineers, managed to construct a flying bridge about two miles upstream from the ferry. After crossing to the left bank, they advanced to the main road, which had been cleared of the enemy by artillery fire from the other side. The pontoons were then laid, and the march resumed.
Sherman ordered Kilpatrick to undertake a significant detour northward, feigning a strong advance on Augusta while attempting to reach and destroy the vital railway bridge and trestles at Briar Creek, near Waynesboro, situated halfway between Augusta and Millen. He was then instructed to proceed to Millen, hoping to liberate the Union prisoners of war held in a prison camp near that location. Kilpatrick moved along one of the primary roads to Augusta, giving the impression that he was marching on that city. After passing the Ogeechee Shoals, Wheeler learned of his movement and quickly concentrated his forces on the Augusta road, where it emerged from the swamps of Briar Creek. Following his orders, Kilpatrick turned the head of his columns to the right, onto the road leading from Warrenton to Waynesborough, and they were well on their way to the latter location before Wheeler became aware of the change in direction.
Murray’s brigade was positioned in the rear, with two of its regiments, the Eighth Indiana and Second Kentucky, serving as the rear guard. These regiments became separated from the main column while camping near Sylvan Grove. Wheeler learned of their location and launched an attack in the middle of the night. Despite being surprised and driven from their camps, the regiments fought their way back.
Confederate General Wheeler persistently pursued with his superior forces, harassing the rear and flank of the column and causing some confusion, but without achieving any significant advantage. Kilpatrick was forced to abandon his attempt to burn the Briar Creek bridge and trestles and to redirect his march southwesterly from Waynesborough, after destroying a mile or two of the railroad. He reported that he had learned that the Millen prisoners had been moved and decided to rejoin the main army. Early on the morning of the 28th, Kilpatrick himself narrowly escaped capture, having unwisely established his quarters for the night some distance from the bulk of his command, with only the Ninth Michigan serving as his guard. The enemy positioned themselves between him and the column, and he had to fight his way out to avoid the consequences of his poor judgment.
The long causeway and bridge at Buck Head Creek were defended by Colonel Heath and the Fifth Ohio, with two howitzers, while the division passed. Wheeler received a severe check. The bridge was destroyed, and Kilpatrick established a strong position at Reynolds’s plantation. Wheeler then launched an attack in force but was decisively repulsed, and Kilpatrick successfully rejoined the infantry without further disruption. Wheeler’s entire corps was involved in this series of intense skirmishes, and he boasted loudly that he had routed Kilpatrick, causing him to flee in disarray with nearly 200 casualties. Frustrated by this setback, Kilpatrick obtained permission to retaliate. After resting his horses for a day or two, he marched from Louisville towards Waynesborough. He attacked Wheeler near the town and drove him from three successive barricades with spirited charges, chasing him through Waynesboro and across Briar Creek. Wheeler admitted that he had difficulty "succeeding in withdrawing" from his position at the town but attempted to downplay his defeat by reporting that the Fourteenth Corps attacked him alongside Kilpatrick’s cavalry.
Millen was reached on December 3, severing direct railway communication between Savannah and Augusta. Three corps then moved down the narrowing space between the Savannah and Ogeechee Rivers. From Millen onward, the march of the entire army proceeded methodically, encountering no significant opposition. Even Wheeler’s horsemen generally maintained a respectful distance and soon crossed to the left bank of the Savannah River. The terrain became more sandy, corn and grain became scarcer, and the troops began to realize that they were approaching the lowlands bordering the sea, where limited breadstuffs or forage could be found. On December 9th and 10th, the columns converged on the defenses of Savannah.
Skilled infantry scouts were dispatched to establish communication with the Union fleet and sever the Gulf Railway, thereby cutting off the city’s last link to the south.
During Sherman’s Famous March to the Sea, the destruction of railway communication between the Confederate Army at Richmond, Virginia, and the Gulf States was essential for Sherman’s objectives. He spared no effort to ensure its thoroughness. A battalion of mechanics was selected and equipped with tools for removing the rails from the cross-ties and twisting them when heated, and these mechanics worked continuously. However, the infantry on the march also became proficient in their own methods, and the cavalry joined in the effort as well, although the nearly constant skirmishing on the flanks and rear of the army kept the mounted troops occupied. A division of infantry would be deployed along the railway line for the length of its assigned front. The men would stack arms and gather along one side of the track. At the command, they would lift the rail line with the ties as high as their shoulders, and then at another command, they would drop the entire structure, stepping back to avoid being hit.
The heavy impact would loosen many of the spikes and chairs. Seizing the loosened rails, the men would use them as levers to quickly pry off the remaining fasteners. The cross-ties would then be piled up like cob-houses, and a fire would be built using the ties and other available fuel. The rails were placed on the fire and would become red hot in the middle within half an hour. Soldiers would then seize the rail by the ends and twist it around a tree or interlace the entire pile together in large, unusable knots, making the rails suitable only for scrap metal and difficult to transport. Using this method, a corps marching along the railway could completely destroy ten or fifteen miles of track in a single day. General William T. Sherman personally supervised the work to ensure that it was not done carelessly. All machine shops, stations, bridges, and culverts were destroyed, and the masonry was blown up.
The extent of the destruction was vast. From the Etowah River through Atlanta southward to Lovejoy’s Station, a hundred miles of the road was completely destroyed. From Fairburn through Atlanta eastward to Madison and the Oconee River, another hundred miles suffered the same fate. From Gordon southeastward, the Central road’s ruin extended to the very outskirts of Savannah, a distance of 160 miles. There were also significant breaks in the branch road from Gordon northward through Milledgeville, which connected Augusta and Millen. Such extensive damage would have caused prolonged disruption even in the North. However, the blockade of Southern ports and the limited manufacturing capacity of the Confederate States made the damage practically irreparable. The destroyed lines were the only ones connecting the Gulf States with the Carolinas. Even if Sherman had not marched northward from Savannah, the Confederacy’s resources would have been severely crippled.
The forage throughout a belt 50-60 miles wide was also destroyed. Both armies participated in this effort, with the Confederate cavalry burning it to prevent it from falling into Union hands. The Union army left nothing that it could not use itself, making wagon transportation of military supplies across the belt more difficult.
As the campaign progressed, many black men, women, and children joined the columns and accompanied the march. Sherman did not approve, as he was concerned about the burden of feeding thousands of additional people. However, those who were not responsible for the campaign did not share this concern. The men in the ranks generally encouraged the slaves to leave the plantations. The slaves, themselves, were eager to seize the opportunity to escape bondage. They viewed the immediate prospect of freedom as more significant than the potential for freedom at the war’s end.
As a result, numerous makeshift camps sprung up around the regular camps of the troops. The black families, old and young, endured hardship, relying on the soldiers’ charity and scavenging in the army’s wake. They trudged along on the march without complaint, believing that "Lincoln’s men" were leading them to a life of ease and abundance.
As the army reached the less fertile lands, the difficulties and military annoyances increased.
Losing patience with the failure of orders and appeals to these people to remain at home, Union General Jefferson C. Davis, commanding the Fourteenth Corps, ordered the pontoon bridge at Ebenezer Creek to be removed before the refugees following the army had crossed. The intention was to leave them on the other side of the unfordable stream to relieve the marching troops. It would be unfair to believe that the order would have been given had the consequences been foreseen. The refugees were so eager for liberation and so fearful of falling into Confederate hands that they rushed into the water in a panic, with wild wailings and cries. Many drowned, despite the soldiers’ efforts to help them. As soon as the extent of the panic became clear, every effort was made to save those in the water, but significant loss of life still occurred.
When Savannah was reached, many refugees accompanying the columns were placed on the Sea Islands under the care of government officers, adding to the established colonies there. The Freedmen’s Bureau subsequently emerged as a direct result of this organization.
The army’s subsistence on the land was a necessary component of Sherman’s plan. However, it is important to distinguish between the planned and ordered foraging and the impromptu activities of soldiers seeking amusement. The official orders were strictly military in nature. The trains’ supplies were to be considered a reserve, to be used only in case of necessity. Systematic foraging on the countryside for daily food was the primary method of obtaining rations. Each regiment organized a foraging party consisting of about one-twentieth of its numbers under the command of an officer.
These parties would set out early in the morning, with parties from the same brigades and divisions coordinating their efforts. They stayed close enough to provide mutual support if attacked by the enemy, aiming to rejoin the column at the designated halting place for the end of the day’s march. The foragers became ideal partisan troops, displaying remarkable self-confidence and daring. No organized line of skirmishers could clear the head of the column of enemy cavalry so quickly. Only an entrenched line of battle could stop them. When scattered on the flank, performing their duties, they would converge from barns, granaries, smoke-houses, and kitchen gardens, driving laden mules piled high with vegetables, smoked bacon, fresh meat, and poultry. As soon as two or three of these foragers met, one would drive the animals, and the others would engage in a bold skirmish from fence corners or behind trees, using their Springfield rifles to gain a range advantage over the carbines of the horsemen. As they were pressed, they would fall back and assemble, with the regimental platoons forming a line of fire that would become too intense for their opponents, forcing them to retire and report that they had driven in the skirmishers upon the main column, which was often miles away. The foraging would then resume. Wheeler’s men rarely broke through these flankers and approached the line troops. As the columns approached their designated evening camp, they would find this abundant supply train waiting for them at every fork in the road, with the regularity of a scheduled railway train.
They brought in all animals that could be used by the army. As mule teams or artillery horses broke down in pulling through the swamps bordering every stream, fresh animals were readily available. As a result, the teams were fat and sleek upon reaching Savannah, in far better condition than they had been at Atlanta.
The orders given to these parties prohibited them from entering occupied private houses or interfering with private property not considered war supplies or munitions. In the best-disciplined divisions, these orders were enforced. However, discipline varied across the army. With 60,000 men, there were enough willing robbers and officers who were willing to overlook irregularities or share in the loot to make such a march a terrible ordeal for the country.
Kilpatrick gained notoriety in this regard, with his immoral behavior and greed setting a demoralizing example for his troops. The best disciplinarians among his subordinates could only mitigate its impact. His enterprise and daring enabled his two brigades to hold their own against Wheeler’s dozen brigades. The value of his services led his commander to overlook transgressions that he could hardly condone, escapades that often nearly resulted in Kilpatrick’s capture and the rout of his command. But he was quite capable, in a night attack, of mounting the first available animal, horse or mule, bare-backed, and charging in his shirt at the head of his troopers with a reckless daring that dismayed his opponents and inspired his men.
The habitual stragglers became numerous enough to cause a nuisance on the line of march. Again, there was considerable variation across different parts of the army. In some brigades, every regiment maintained its rearguard to prevent straggling. The brigade provost-guard marched in the rear, arresting those who attempted to leave the ranks and reporting the regimental commander who allowed his men to scatter. Over time, the stragglers became so numerous that they prompted serious complaints. They followed the command without joining it for days, living off the land and avoiding the labors of their comrades. These were the individuals to whom the name "bummer" was appropriately applied. This class was present in both the Confederate and Union armies, proportional to their strength. Southern people demanded the most severe military justice against them. Responsible individuals sent specific complaints to the Confederate War Secretary, alleging scandalous acts of robbery and pillage by their own troops. Leading newspapers demanded the cashiering and shooting of colonels and other officers, claiming that their conduct was worse than that of the enemy. It is likely impossible to conduct a major war without such abuses. However, it is reassuring that the vast majority of the offenses involved property, and murders, rapes, and other heinous personal crimes were nearly unknown.
The majority of the officers and soldiers worked hard and continuously, marching, bridging streams, building corduroy roads through the swamps, lifting wagons and cannons from mud-holes, and tearing up the railways. They saw little of the local population and knew comparatively little about the foragers’ work, other than enjoying the results and the comical spectacle of the cavalcade as it arrived at night. The foragers transformed into beasts of burden, oxen, cows, horses, and mules. A silver-mounted family carriage drawn by a jackass and a cow, loaded inside and out with everything the country produced, both vegetable and animal, dead and alive, would be seen. An ox-cart, similarly loaded and drawn by a nondescript team, would be equally unpredictable. Perched on top would be a ragged forager, wearing a fur hat in a style worn by dandies a century before, or a dress coat that had seen service at stylish balls in a previous generation. The jibes and jokes, the fun and the practical jokes ran down the entire line as the procession arrived. No masquerade during a carnival could compare with it for original humor and rollicking enjoyment.
The weather was generally favorable. A brief period of snow and cold wind occurred around November 23, but Indian summer followed, and on December 8, the heat was even sultry. The camps in the open pine-woods, the bonfires along the railways, and the occasional mock battles at night, with blazing pine-knots used as weapons whirling in the darkness, all combined to create the impression of a vast holiday frolic. In reunions of veterans since the war, this campaign has always been remembered as a romantic dream rather than a reality. No chorus is sung with such joyous enthusiasm as when they join in the refrain, "As we were marching through Georgia."
By Jacob Dolson Cox, 1910. Compiled and edited by Kathy Alexander, updated May 2025.
Source: This article was excerpted from Jacob Dolson Cox’s 1910 book, The March to the Sea: Franklin and Nashville, published by C. Scribner, 1910. However, please note that the text as it appears here is far from verbatim, as it has been heavily edited, truncated, and updated.
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